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Abstract— The main objective of this paper is to provide a 
global decision-reaction architectural built on the 
requirements for a reaction after alert detection mechanisms in 
the frame of information systems security and more 
particularly applied to telecom infrastructures security. These 
infrastructures are distributed in nature, therefore the 
architecture is elaborated using the multi-agents system that 
provides the advantages of autonomous and interaction 
facilities, and has been associated to the ontoBayes model for 
decision support mechanism. This model helps agents to make 
decisions according to preference values and is built upon 
ontology based knowledge sharing, bayesian networks based 
uncertainty management and influence diagram based decision 
support. The Multi-Agent System decision-reaction 
architecture is developed in a distributed perspective and is 
composed of three basic layers: low level, intermediate level 
and high level. The proposed approach has been illustrated 
based on the network architecture for heterogeneous mobile 
computing developed by the BARWAN project. Accordingly: 
the Building Area constitutes the low level and aims to be the 
interface between the main architecture and the targeted 
infrastructure. The Campus-Area is the intermediate level 
responsible of correlating the alerts coming from different 
domains of the infrastructure and to smartly deploy the 
reaction actions.  
Keywords-security; decision system; recaction; distributed 
network; bayesian network; multi agent system. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today information systems and mobile computing 
networks are more widely spread and mainly heterogeneous. 
This basically involves more complexity through their 
opening, their interconnection, and their ability to make 
decisions [1]. Consequently, this has a dramatic drawback 
regarding threats that could occur on such networks via 
dangerous attacks [2]. This continuously growing amount of 
carry out malicious acts encompasses new and always more 
sophisticated attack techniques, which are actually exposing 
operators as well as the end user.  
State of the art in terms of security reaction is limited to 
products that detect attacks and correlate them with a 
vulnerability database but none of these products are built to 
ensure a proper reaction to attacks in order to avoid their 
propagation and/or to help an administrator deploy the 
appropriate reactions [3, 4]. In the same way, [5] says that at 
the individual host-level, intrusion response often includes 
security policy reconfiguration to reduce the risk of further 
penetrations but doesn't propose another solution in term of 
automatic response and reaction. It is the case of CISCO 
based IDS material providing mechanisms to select and 
implement reaction decision. 
Information security management and communication 
systems is actually in front of many challenges [6] due to 
the fact that it is very often difficult to establish central or 
local permanent decision capabilities, have the necessary 
level of information, quickly collect the information, which 
is critical in case of an attack on a critical system node, or 
launch automated counter measures to quickly block a 
detected attack. 
Based on that statements, it appears crucial to elaborate a 
strategy of reaction after detection against these attacks  Our 
previous work around that topic has provided first issues 
regarding that finding and has been somewhat presented in 
[6] and [7]. These papers have proposed an architecture to 
highlight the concepts aiming at fulfilling the mission of 
optimizing security and protection of communication and 
information systems which purpose was to achieve the 
following: 
 Reacting quickly and efficiently to any simple attack 
but also to any complex and distributed ones; 
 Ensuring homogeneous and smart communication 
system configuration, that are commonly considered 
and the main sources of vulnerabilities. 
One of the main aspects in the reaction strategy consists 
of automating and adapting policies when an attack occurs. 
In scientific literature a large number of definitions for 
policy and conceptual model exist. The most famous are 
Ponder [8] and Ponder2 [34], Policy Description Language 
[9] and Security Policy Language [10]. For the purpose of 
that paper, we prefer the one provided by Damianou et al. in 
[8]: Policies are rules that govern the behavior of a system. 
The provided policy adaptation is considered as a 
regulation process. The main steps of the policy regulation 
are described in Fig. 1, which shows the process that takes 
the business rules as input, and maps them onto technical 
policies. These technical policies are deployed and 
instantiated on the infrastructure in order to have a new state 
of temporary network security stability adapted to the 
ongoing attack. This policy regulation is thereafter achieved 
in modifying/adding new policy rules to reach a new 
 standing (at least up to the next network disruption) policy 
based on the observation of the system’s current situation.  
In this paper, we focus our work on policy deployment 
and on policy modification decision-reaction challenges as 
highlighted in the rounded rectangle of Fig. 1. This twofold 
challenge has already been addressed by other researches 
like in [11]. Torrellas explains that facilitating timely 
decision-making may achieve much greater productivity 
benefits by engineering network security systems using 
multi-agents. In [12], Yu developed the concepts of tele-
service and proposed an implementation of an e-maintenance 
platform based on a Mulit Agent System (MAS). Yu 
explained how a Case-Based Reasoning [13] method may be 
used to improve the autonomous decision-making ability. 
Others’ works propose rather similar solutions like [14, 15] 
but none are explicitly dedicated to the management of 
security alerts reaction in the field of open and 
heterogeneous networks. Consequently, the combination of 
the reaction mechanism with the decision support system 
remains, for those solutions, a poorly addressed requirement 
in parallel to other more specific constraints related to the 
characteristics of the context. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Policy regulation 
To illustrate this decision mechanism, we use the results 
of the BARWAN1 project. This project focused on enabling 
truly useful mobile networking across an extremely wide 
variety of real-world networks and mobile devices. The case 
study analyzed by the project is a medical application 
enabled by wide-area wireless and that exploits the Berkeley 
InfoPad[35] pooled computing power to permit a small 
number of workstations to support a large number of end 
users. Fig.3 highlights the distribution of the application 
over the buildings, the campus and the metropolitan layers. 
In that paper, an architecture is proposed to adapt a reaction 
once an attack occur on one of those layers. Additionally, 
the architecture makes is possible to integrate internal or 
external contextual information for the reaction decision 
like, i.e. the usage of the application, as proposed in the case 
study, during a medical rescue operation after a serious auto 
accident on Golden Gate Bridge2.  
                                                          
1 Bay Area Research Wireless Access Network project, conducted at the 
University of California at Berkeley. 
2 The complete case study is available on http://bnrg.eecs.berkeley.edu/ 
~randy/Daedalus/BARWAN/BARWAN_application.html 
The next section introduces the MAS architecture, 
section 3 exposes the decision support system as well as its 
combination with the MAS, and the last section concludes 
the paper. 
II. MULTI AGENT SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
MAS is composed of several agents, capable of mutual 
interaction. The interaction can be in the form of message 
passing or producing changes in their common environment. 
Agents are pro-actively, reactively and socially autonomous 
entities able to exhibit organized activity, in order to meet 
their design objectives, by eventually interacting with users. 
An agent is collaborative by being able to commit itself to 
society or/and another agent.  
An agent encapsulates a state and a behavior and 
provides moreover a number of facilities such as: control of 
its behavior, the ability to decide even if external events 
influence its decision, the possibility to exert its control in 
various manners (reactively, directed by goals, socially). 
Moreover, MAS have several control flows while a system 
with objects has a priori only one control flow. 
The agents also have global behavior within the MAS, 
such as the cooperation (agents share the same goal), 
collaboration (agents share intermittently the same goal) or 
competition (incompatible goals between agents). 
To manage several different systems, due to their 
location, their business domain or their organization type, a 
distributed system is appropriate. Furthermore, a distributed 
solution brings some autonomy to the managed systems. 
Robustness, survivability and availability are also impacted. 
The distributed architecture introduced in this paper is 
composed by several components, called “operators”, which 
have different responsibilities. Those operators are organized 
in two dimensions, as presented in Fig. 2.  
The vertical dimension, structured in layers relative to the 
managed network organization, allows adding abstraction in 
going upward. Indeed, the lowest layer is closed to the 
managed system and thus being the interface between the 
targeted network and the management system. The higher 
layer exposes a global view of the whole system and is able 
to take some decisions based on a more complete knowledge 
of the system, business, and organization. Intermediate levels 
(1 to n-1) guarantee flexibility and scalability to the 
architecture in order to consider management constraints of 
the targeted infrastructure. Those middleware levels are 
optional but allow the system to be better adapted to the 
complexity of a given organization and the size of the 
information system.  
The horizontal dimension, containing three basic 
components, is presented in Fig. 2 and its three main phases 
are described below: 
1) Alert: Collect, normalize, correlate, analyze the alerts 
coming from the managed networks and represent an 
intrusion or an attack. If the alert is confirmed and coherent, 
it is forwarded to the reaction decision component. (Alert 
Correlation Engine-ACE). 
2) Reaction Decision: Receive confirmed alerts for 
which a reaction is expected. Considering the knowledge of: 
 policy, the systems’ organization and specified behavior, 
these components decide if a reaction is needed or not and 
define the reaction, if there is any. The reaction will be 
modification(s), addition(s) or removal(s) of current policy 
rules. (Police Instantiation Engine-PIE). 
3) Reaction: Instantiation and deployment of the new 
policies, on the targeted networks. The deployment (Policy 
Deployment Point – PDP) and enforcement (Policy 
Enforcement Point – PEP) of these new policies, lead to a 
new security state of the network. The terminology in italic 
used in section 4 is extracted from both: XACML [16] and 
OrBAC Model [17, 18]. 
Figure 2.  Reaction Architecture Overview 
An issue is raised considering which layer is allowed to 
take a decision reaction: only one layer, two, several, or all? 
If more than one layer can trigger a reaction on the same 
object(s), there will be a conflict issue. Thus, the system 
should be able to provide mechanisms to solve conflicts 
between several selected reactions. Another issue concerns 
the agreement: at which level should it be asked? A solution 
could be to ask at the same level (or at an upper one) that the 
reaction decision is made; this should be specified by the 
user. A possible solution is a distributed, vertically layered 
and hierarchical architecture. The layer's number could be 
adapted according to the managed systems’ organization. In 
our case, three layers are sufficient (local, intermediate and 
global). The reaction system is composed of three main 
parts: the alert management part, the reaction part and the 
police definition-deployment part. Three trees (alert, reaction 
and policy) could be placed side by side, as presented in Fig. 
2. These trees are alike but their operators have different 
functions. The alert tree collects the alerts with the local 
operators and correlate them in several steps, one step by 
layer.  
Fig 3. explains how the reaction architecture is mapped 
onto the BARWAN network (borrowed from [33]). The 
three layers are from top to bottom: The metropolitan Area, 
The campus area, and the in-building network (building A 
and B).  
The next step of our research development is firstly the 
definition of a reaction engine that encompasses both, 
architecture components and the communication engine 
between these components. This engine is based on a 
message format and on a message exchange protocol based 
on standards such as [19]. Secondly, real cases are studied in 
order to experiment with the architecture and its associated 
protocol. 
The message format is defined in XML format and is 
structured around a number of attributes that specify the 
message source, the message destination and the message 
type (alert, reaction, policy request, policy modification, 
policy modification validation, decision and 
synchronization). The protocol defines the exchange format 
and the workflow of messages between the architecture 
components. It encompasses a set a rules governing the 
syntax, semantics, and synchronization of communication. 
The technical requirements request the operator structure 
must be flexible in order to be able to reorganize itself, if an 
operator fails or disappears. Each operator also has to be 
autonomous in order to permit reorganization. Given these 
requirements, the use of a MAS appears as a solution to 
provide autonomy, flexibility and decision mechanisms to 
each operator that are consequently represented by agents.  
As studied in the state of the art presented in [20], a set of 
agents could be managed and controlled through an 
organization. An organization is a set of agents playing roles, 
gathered in a normative structure and expecting to achieve 
some global and local objectives. Several models like the 
roles model, the tasks model, the interaction model or the 
norms models specify an organization.  
In our context we need an interaction definition in order 
to specify communication protocols between agents 
representing operators. We also need roles in order to specify 
which agent will have to communicate or act in order to 
detect intrusions and then react. Based on this needs, the use 
of an electronic institution based on agents is one of the 
possibilities that we will investigate. 
The main goal of the reaction policy enforcement engine is 
to apply policies in terms of specific concrete rules on 
“technical” devices (firewall, fileserver, and other systems 
named PEP). For that, we need means to make ACE, PIE, 
PDP and PEP interact and collaborate.  
 Figure 3.  Mapping of the BARWAN architecture with the Multi-Agent System reaction architecture 
The multi-agents systems concept already defines 
architectures and models for autonomous agents’ 
organization and interaction. Existing platforms like JADE 
(Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) [21, 22] implement 
agents’ concepts as well as their ability to communicate by 
exchanging messages and the reaction components 
integration could be simplified. This is a solution, which will 
be detailed hereafter. The Foundation for Intelligent Physical 
Agents (FIPA) [23] promotes the success of emerging agent-
based applications, services and equipment. It makes 
available internationally agreed specifications that maximize 
interoperability across agent based applications, services and 
equipment pursue this goal. This is realized through open 
international collaboration of member organizations, which 
are companies and universities active in the agent field. 
FIPA's specifications are publicly available. They are not 
technologies for specific application, but generic 
technologies for different application areas, and not just 
independent technologies but a set of basic technologies that 
can be integrated by developers to make complex systems 
with a high degree of interoperability. 
The used multi-agent framework is JADE. We base 
ourselves on a survey made in [24] to argue that this agent 
platform responds to the expectations in terms of agents' 
functionalities, security, performance, standardization, and 
secure communication between agents. 
Fig. 4 introduces the developed architecture. The flow is 
supposed to begin with an alert detected by the IDS 
positioned on the InfoPad server. This alert is send to the 
BuildingA_ ACE agent. This ACE agent confirms or not the 
alert to the PIE. This decision to confirm the alert is 
explained in section 3. Afterwards, the PIE decides to apply 
new policies or to forward the alert to an ACE from a higher 
layer (upper ACE). Its PIE agent sends the policies to the 
PDP agent, which decides which PEP is able to implement it 
in terms of rules or script on devices (InfoPad server, 
fileserver, etc.) Then, the PDP agent sends the new policy to 
the InfoPad PEP agent that knows how to transform a policy 
into a rule or script understandable by the InfoPad server. 
On Fig. 4, dash dot lines stand for flow of messages 
encompassing alert or alert confirmation. Full lines stand for 
flow of messages containing policies information, and dot 
lines are reserved for decision support mechanisms. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Multi-Agent System reaction architecture 
 A focused analysis of the PDP shows that it is composed 
by several modules. For the multi-agent system point of 
view, the Component Configuration Mapper results from the 
interaction between the PDP agent and the Facilitator Agent 
while the Policy Analysis module is realized by the PDP 
agent. The Facilitator manages the network topology by 
retrieving PEP agents according to their localization (devices 
registered with IP address or MAC address) or according to 
actions they could apply and their type (firewall, file server, 
etc.). For that the Facilitator uses white pages and yellow 
pages services. The JADE platform already provides 
implemented facilitator and searching services. Besides, the 
use of a multi-agent system as the framework provides 
flexibility, openness and heterogeneity. Actually, when we 
decide to add a new PEP, we just have to provide its PEP 
Agent with the ability to concretely apply the policies that 
will register itself through the Facilitator, which will update 
the databases. 
Wherever Times is specified, Times Roman or Times 
New Roman may be used. If neither is available on your 
word processor, please use the font closest in appearance to 
Times. Avoid using bit-mapped fonts if possible. True-Type 
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III. DECISION SUPPORT ARCHITECTURE 
Section 2 explains the developed MAS architecture that 
guarantees a telecommunication security incident reaction. 
Section 3 explains the implementation of the decision 
mechanism. The MAS architecture has voluntarily been 
explained before the Decision Support System (DSS) part 
because components of this architecture are used for the 
illustration of the DSS. 
One important challenge of the DSS is the management 
of uncertainty. Uncertainty is defined as situation “caused by 
a lack of knowledge about the environment when a gents 
need to decide the truth of statement.” 
Decision is a process [25] and consequently, it may be 
represented using its input and its output. For the security 
incident reaction, inputs of the alert sending decision 
mechanism are for instance: the severity, duration and 
frequency of the alerts, the contribution of the system to the 
medical rescue operation (if any), or the criticality of that 
rescue operation. Outputs of the process are for instance: the 
escalation of the alert to upper ACE or its confirmation to the 
PIE. For the clarity of the paper, some parameters from the 
case study will be partially omitted. 
As explained by Yang [26], the decision-making 
mechanism is composed of four pillars: Ontology, Bayesian 
Networks (BN), Influence Diagram (ID) and Virtual 
Knowledge Community (VKC). In the framework of that 
paper, the VKC will not be treated because the use of the 3 
first pillars is enough to understand the decision mechanism. 
The approach preferred to design the decision mechanism is 
adapted from the research performed by Yang’s thesis for the 
incident reaction through a MAS architecture. As a 
consequence our solution differs from and completes the 
Yang research since our DSS is illustrated by a real 
architecture for incident reaction that is really deployed in 
our research labs. 
A. Ontology 
Ontology is the first pillar and is defined by a formal, 
explicit specification of a shared conceptualization [27]. 
Ontology may be categorized as domain ontology when it 
concerns concepts and their relations from a same and well-
defined domain or top-level ontology when it concerns very 
general domain-independent concepts. Ontology is the most 
import pillar in that, it will be adapted to support the second 
pillar concerning the Bayesian Network and the third pillar 
concerning the Influence Diagram. 
For the incident reaction system, ontology is defined 
using the Web Ontology Language (OWL). Resource 
Development Frameworks (RDF) syntax is the most 
commonly used method to model information or meta-
concepts in OWL. It may be implemented in web resources 
and is structured based on the triple (object, subject, 
predicate). Fig. 5 illustrates RDF graph. Both, object and 
subject are resources whereas predicate is an attribute or a 
relation used to describe a resource. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  RDF graph 
 
 
Figure 6.  Dependency graph 
 
In parallel to the MAS architecture developed in section 
3, we need a DSS to decide the transfer of an alert from the 
IDS to the BuildingA ACE3, for the forward of that alert to 
an upper ACE, and for the confirmation of the alert to the 
PIE. This is formalized using OWL as explained in Fig. 7. 
On that figure, ovals stand for OWL class, solid arrow lines 
stand for RDF predicate, dash arrows for influence relations 
and rounded rectangles for set of domain value. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Decision system for alert transfer using OWL 
                                                          
3 ACE agent in the BuildingA Local Area Network where alert is sent 
 B. OntoBayes 
Ontology developed in the previous section permits to 
formalize the concept encompassed in the MAS architecture 
as well as their relations. However, at that the ontological 
level of formalization, uncertainty challenge remains 
unaddressed and decision mechanism remained needed for 
the agents to take the decision. 
OntoBayes is an extension of OWL with two features: 
Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagram. BN address the 
uncertainty and ID support the decision mechanism process. 
 
1) Bayesian networks extension 
 
In probabilistic, Bayes Theorem is a simple mathematical 
formula used for calculating conditional probabilities [28]. It 
means that the calculations of probability depend on prior 
knowledge that could be considered as uncertain. I.e.: the 
probability of having a high impact on the medical rescue if 
we have before an alert of medium severity. This probability 
is written P(alert.severity|rescue.impact). 
The BNs extension of OWL introduces the parameters of 
that formula by specifies the following two perspectives: a 
qualitative perspective and a quantitative perspective. The 
qualitative perspective specifies the random variables 
explicitly as well as their dependencies and the later 
associates’ quantitative information to those variables.  
The specification of random variable and their 
dependency is performed by introducing the new OWL 
property element <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf.ID=”dependsOn”/> and could be graphical 
represented as illustrated on Fig. 6. 
Accordingly, the qualitative extension may be 
represented by 2 Bayesian graph models (Fig. 8) extracted 
from the OWL graph model from Fig. 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.   Bayesian graph models for alert sending and alert confirmation 
processes 
The ovals represent Bayesian variables and the arrows 
specify their relations. The graph is to be read i.e. 1.: The 
alert that is forwarded from the BuildingB ACE to the 
network upper ACE has influence on the confirmation of the 
alert that is send from the Campus-Area ACE to the PIE. I.e. 
2.: The severity of the alert has influence on the action to 
send an alert to the BuildingA ACE. The last examples may 
be translated using the new OWL dependsOn element as 
following : 
 
<owl:Class rdf:ID=”alert.severity”>, 
  <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty> 
      <owl:ObjectProperty red:ID=”dependsOn”/> 
      </owl:onProperty> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:resource=”system.impact”> 
  </owl:Restriction> 
</owl:class> 
Figure 9.   Dependency encoding 
The quantitative extension is performed with the 
association of probability table to the Bayesian variables. In 
the case of the BARWAN example, the Table 1 provides de 
quantitative probability P(alert.severity|rescue.impact) and is 
represented on Fig. 4 by the Bayesian variables database. 
TABLE I.  BAYESIAN VARIABLES VALUE PROBABILITY 
ProbCell. HasPParameters HasPValue
Cell_1 alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=low 0,8
Cell_2 alert.severity=medium|rescue.impact=low 0,4
Cell_3 alert.severity=high|rescue.impact=low 0,1
Cell_4 alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=medium 0,3
Cell_5 alert.severity=medium|rescue.impact=medium 0,9
Cell_6 alert.severity=high|rescue.impact=medium 0,5
Cell_7 alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=high 0,1
Cell_8 alert.severity=medium|rescue.impact=high 0,4
Cell_9 alert.severity=high|rescue.impact=high 0,7
 
 
The conditional probability from Table 1 is encoded as 
follows (Fig. 10): 
 
 
<owl:Class rdf:ID=”Alert”> 
  <CondProbDist rdf:ID=”table_1”> 
    <hasPCell> 
      <ProbC rdf:ID=”Cell_1”> 
        <HasPValue rdf:Iddatatype=”#float”> 
        >0,8</HasPValue> 
        <HasParameters rdf:datatype=”#string” 
        >alert.severity=low|rescue.impact=low> 
        </HasParameters> 
      </ProbC> 
     </HasPCell> 
     ... 
   </CondProbDist> 
</owl:Class> 
Figure 10.  Bayesian variables value probability encoding 
2)  Influence diagrams extension 
 
IDs extension aims at representing and analyzing a 
decisional model to support the decision-making process. 
The review of the literature that treats ID [29,30] shows that 
decision mechanisms are composed by three types of nodes: 
1) Chance nodes that represent variables that are not 
controled by the decision maker, 2) Decision nodes that 
represent choices available for the decision maker, and 3) 
Utility nodes that represent agent utility functions. 
Additionally, [31] explains that three type of arcs express the 
relationship between nodes: I) Information arcs 
(isKnownBy) that point out the information that is necessary 
for the decision maker, II) Conditional arcs (influenceOn) 
that point out the probabilistic dependency on the associated 
variable, and III) Functional arcs (attributeOf) that point 
out variables used by utility nodes as decision criteria. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 11.   ID’s graph model of alert transfer 
Based on that structure of decisional model, the alert 
transfer may be represented in Fig. 11. Ovals stand for 
Chance nodes, rectangles stand for Decision nodes, and 
diamonds stand for Utility nodes. The information arc relates 
to all information observed to make a decision and the 
conditional arc relates to data issued from Chance node and 
considered as evidence for the Decision nodes. 
Additionally, to make a decision, the agent that takes a 
decision needs to have its preferences quantified according to 
a set of attributes. In [32], Butler introduces the theory of 
multi-attribute utility (MAUT) to quantify a preference with 
numerical value. The most important preference has the 
higher value whereas the worst has the lower one. To 
achieve that, the Utility node is associated with a utility table 
that gathers the preferences of all decision choices. Table 2 
shows these preferences for the BuildingA ACE alert 
sending decision taking mechanism and is represented by the 
utility database in Fig. 4. 
TABLE II.  UTILITY TABLE FOR IN-LAN ACE ALERT SENDING 
UtilityCell. HasUParameters hasUValue
Cell_1 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes|severity.alert=low -80
Cell_2 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes|severity.alert=medium 50
Cell_3 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes|severity.alert=high 100
Cell_4 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no|severity.alert=low 80
Cell_5 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no|severity.alert=medium 40
Cell_6 send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no|severity.alert=high -100
 
 
The Fig. 13 shows the encoding of Table 2 utility table for 
BuildingA_ACE alert sending : 
 
 
owl:Class rdf:ID=”send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)”> 
  <owl:Restriction> 
    <owl:onProperty> 
      <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID=”attributeOf”/> 
      </owl:onProperty> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:resource=#U 
  </owl:Restriction> 
     ... 
  <rdfs:subClassOf> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:ID=”DecisionNode”/> 
  </rdfs:subClassOf> 
</owl:Class> 
<owl:Class rdf:ID=”severity.alert”> 
     ... 
  <rdfs:subClassOf> 
    <owl:hasValue rdf:ID=”ChanceNode”/> 
  </rdfs:subClassOf> 
</owl:Class> 
<owl:Class rdf:ID=”U1”> 
  <UtilityTable rdf:ID=”table_1”> 
    <hasUCell> 
      <UtilityCell rdf:ID=”cell_1”> 
        <hasUParameter rdf:datatype=”#string” 
        
>send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=yes,severity.alert=low 
        </hasUParameter> 
        <hasUValue rdf:datatype=”#float” 
        >-80</hasValue> 
      </UtilityCell> 
    </hasUCell> 
     ... 
    <hasUCell> 
      <UtilityCell rdf:ID=”cell_6”> 
        <hasUParameter rdf:datatype=”#string” 
        > send(alert.BuildingA_ACE)=no, 
        > severity.alert=high 
        </hasUParameter> 
        <hasUValue rdf:datatype=”#float” 
        >-100</hasValue> 
      </UtilityCell> 
    </hasUCell> 
..</UtilityTable> 
</owl:Class> 
 
Figure 12.  Utility encoding 
As seen in Fig. 6, a sequential path between all decisions 
exists. Indeed, some decision depends on previous decisions 
and as a consequence, previous decisions (decision node) 
become chance nodes for next chance node. Fig. 11 
illustrates that send(alert.BuildingA_ACE) is at the same 
time a decision node and a Chance node that is known be the 
decision node alertForward2(BuildingA_ACE,Campus-
AreaACE). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a global and integrated 
decision-reaction architecture developed for an incident 
reaction system and based on a policy regulation approach 
strategy. The solution is composed firstly with a MAS that 
offers the advantage to react quickly and efficiently against 
an attack while being adapted for heterogeneous and 
distributed networks and secondly with a decision support 
system that helps agents to make decisions based on utility 
preference values. This is achieved by taking uncertainty into 
account through Bayesian networks and influence diagram. 
The architecture has been illustrated based on the 
network architecture for heterogeneous mobile computing 
developed by the BARWAN project. Accordingly, 
contextual information has been introduced in the decision 
mechanism like i.e. the criticality of the medical rescue 
operations.  
The decision support system has been explained for the 
transfer of an alert from the alert correlation engine to the 
policy instantiation engine. Other decision points exist in the 
architecture. All of them could be solved using decision 
support system but they are not explained in the paper. 
The future works based on our achievements will be the 
specification of a protocol, specification of the messages and 
thus the reaction methodology service oriented based. This 
protocol and methodology will be dedicated to the 
architecture presented in this paper and address the 
interoperability issues with regard to the policy 
representation and modeling. 
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